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1 Introduction
Often times, some individuals who apply for a treatment are non-takers. They decline to get
treated when they receive an offer, for instance because they then realize that their benefit from
treatment is lower than they thought. When a treatment is oversubscribed but some applicants
are non-takers, an appealing way of allocating the available seats is to use randomized waitlists.
First, applicants are ranked randomly. Then, if S seats are available, an initial round of offers
takes place, whereby the first S applicants get an offer. If r of them decline it, a subsequent
round of offers takes place whereby the next r applicants get an offer. Offers stop when all the
seats have been filled. This allocation method is fair: each taker has the same probability of
being treated; it is also efficient: no seat for treatment remains unused, despite the presence
of non-takers. Therefore, oversubscribed treatments with non-takers are often allocated by
randomized waitlists. We conducted a survey, and found 43 articles studying treatments
allocated by randomized waitlists, ranging from charter schools in the USA to agricultural
trainings in Liberia. These treatments often have capacity constraints for various groups of
applicants. For instance, a charter school may have 20 seats available in 7th grade and 25
seats in 8th grade. Then, a lottery takes place in each group.
As applicants are ranked randomly, it may be possible to form two comparable groups with
different likelihoods of getting an offer. One could then compare those two groups to estimate
the effect of the treatment. In practice, researchers have used two types of comparisons. Some
researchers have compared applicants getting and not getting an initial offer, thus giving rise
to the so-called initial-offer (IO) estimators. Other researchers have compared applicants ever
and never getting an offer, thus giving rise to the so-called ever-offer (EO) estimators. When
several lotteries were conducted, as in the charter school example above, researchers have often
included waitlist fixed effects in their specifications, to ensure they compare applicants within
and not across waitlists. In our survey, 22 articles used the EO estimator, 20 used the IO
estimator, and a handful used other estimators. Overall, practices are not standardized.
We start by showing that the expected proportion of takers is strictly greater among applicants
ever getting an offer than among applicants never getting one. Intuitively, this is because offers
continue until sufficiently many takers have gotten an offer. Moreover, when waitlist fixed
effects are included in the estimation, they induce an endogenous reweighting of waitlists that
usually further increases this imbalance between the two groups, as we explain in more detail
in Section 2. Then, we show that due to this imbalance, the EO estimator is inconsistent when
the number of waitlists goes to infinity. In our survey, we find that articles using randomized
waitlists often pool data from a large number of small waitlists, thus motivating the asymptotic
sequence we consider. By contrast, if the number of applicants and takers per waitlist goes
to infinity, the asymptotic bias of the EO estimator goes to 0. Accordingly, in simulations we
find that the EO estimator is more biased when waitlists have fewer applicants and takers.
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It turns out that what creates the imbalance between applicants getting and not getting an
offer is the fact that in each waitlist, the last applicant getting an offer must by construction
be a taker. Indeed, we show that dropping that applicant in each waitlist is sufficient to
restore the comparability between those two groups. Based on this result, we propose a new
estimator of the treatment effect. It is built out of comparisons of applicants that get and do
not get an offer in each waitlist, downweighting applicants that accept their offer by an amount
equivalent to dropping one of them. Then, our estimator takes a weighted average of those
within-waitlist comparisons, with a weighting scheme that avoids the endogeneous reweighting
induced by the waitlist fixed effects. We refer to those estimators as the doubly-reweighted
ever-offer estimators (DREO). We show that our estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normal when the number of waitlists goes to infinity.
Contrary to subsequent-round offers, initial offers are only a function of applicants’ random
ranks in the waitlist. Therefore, applicants getting and not getting an initial offer are statis-
tically comparable, and the IO estimator is also consistent. However, we find in simulations
that the variance of that estimator is much larger than that of the DREO estimator, so using
it will often result in large efficiency losses.
We use our results to revisit Blattman & Annan (2016), who studied the effects of an agricul-
tural training. The DREO estimator is significantly and economically different from the EO
estimator computed by the authors for some of the outcomes they considered.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a simple example to give the
intuition of our results. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 presents our empirical
application. Appendix A presents the proofs. In our web appendix, we present our survey of
articles that have used randomized waitlists, we show that some of the assumptions adopted
in the paper can be relaxed, we present some simulations, and we revisit another application.
2 Introducing the results through a simple example
We start with a simple example. We consider a waitlist where five applicants compete for
three seats. Four applicants are takers (T ) and one is a non-taker (NT ), meaning that she
will refuse to get treated if she gets an offer. Applicants are randomly ranked, and treatment
offers are made following that ranking until all seats are filled. Table 1 displays the five
possible orderings of the takers and the non-taker. For each ordering, applicants getting an
offer are depicted in italics, while those not getting an offer are depicted in bold. In orderings
1 and 2, the first three applicants are takers, so offers stop after the third offer. In orderings
3, 4, and 5, one of the first three applicants is a non-taker, so a fourth offer is made; then the
next applicant is a taker so offers stop as the available seats have been filled.
1A Stata adofile computing the DREO estimator is available from the authors’ website.
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The first issue with the EO estimator is that, on average, applicants getting an offer bear
a higher proportion of takers than applicants not getting an offer. Each ordering has a 0.20
probability of being selected. Across the five orderings, the expected share of takers among ap-
plicants getting an offer is 0.2×(1 + 1 + 3/4 + 3/4 + 3/4) = 17/20. On the other hand, the ex-
pected share of takers among applicants not getting an offer is 0.2×(1/2 + 1/2 + 1 + 1 + 1) =
4/5. Intuitively, this imbalance arises because offers stop when sufficiently many takers have
accepted an offer. This endogenous stopping rule creates a positive correlation between get-
ting an offer and being a taker. When the average potential outcomes of takers and non
takers differ,2 this imbalance implies that applicants getting and not getting an offer are not
statistically comparable: those two groups have different average potential outcomes.
Table 1: Applicants getting and not getting an offer in an example
Ordering 1 Ordering 2 Ordering 3 Ordering 4 Ordering 5
T T T T NT
T T T NT T
T T NT T T
T NT T T T
NT T T T T
The second issue with the EO estimator arises from the inclusion of fixed effects when pooling
waitlists. Assume that one pools waitlists that all have four takers, one non-taker, and three
seats. In some waitlists, the realized ordering of takers and non-takers is ordering 1 in Table
1, in other waitlists the realized ordering is ordering 2, etc. With several waitlists, it follows
from, e.g., Equation (3.3.7) in Angrist & Pischke (2008), that the EO estimator with waitlist
fixed effects is a weighted average of the EO estimators in each waitlist, that gives more weight
to waitlists where the share of applicants getting an offer is closer to 1/2. In our example, 2/3
of applicants get an offer in waitlists with ordering 1 or 2, while 4/5 of applicants get an offer
in waitlists with ordering 3, 4, or 5. Accordingly, waitlists with ordering 1 or 2 receive more
weight. But those are precisely the waitlists where the proportion of takers among applicants
getting an offer is the highest. Therefore, the reweighting of waitlists induced by the fixed
effects aggravates the over-representation of takers among applicants getting an offer.
The DREO estimator we propose addresses those two issues. Firstly, in our example dropping
the last taker getting an offer is sufficient to solve the endogenous stopping rule issue. Table
2 shows that then, the expected share of takers among applicants getting an offer is equal
to 0.2× (1 + 1 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 2/3) = 4/5, the same as among applicants not getting an offer.
Still, dropping the last taker getting an offer is arbitrary: dropping the first or the second
2This is often the case. Abadie et al. (2002) and Crépon et al. (2015) are just a few examples of the many
papers that have found large differences between the average potential outcomes of takers and non-takers.
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would have the same effect. Besides, doing so reduces the sample size and statistical precision.
Instead, one can give to the three of them a weight equal to 2/3: this reduces the expected share
of takers among applicants getting an offer by the same amount as dropping one. Secondly,
instead of using fixed effects to pool waitlists, we simply take an average of the estimators in
each waitlist, weighting waitlists proportionally to their number of applicants. These weights
are independent of how many offers one has to make to fill the available seats, which solves
the second issue of the EO estimator. Table 2 shows that this second reweighting is necessary.
Even after downweighting takers getting an offer, including waitlist fixed effects would still
lead to over-represent takers among applicants getting an offer. Indeed, doing so gives more
weight to waitlists with ordering 1 or 2, where 1/2 of applicants get an offer, while those are
the waitlists where the proportion of takers among applicants getting an offer is the highest.
Table 2: Applicants getting and not getting an offer, dropping the last
taker getting an offer
Ordering 1 Ordering 2 Ordering 3 Ordering 4 Ordering 5
T T T T NT
T T T NT T
NT T T
T NT
NT T T T T
3 Main results
3.1 Assumptions and parameter of interest
Throughout the paper, we consider the following set-up.
Assumption 1 (Set-up)
a) Applicants for a binary treatment are divided into K mutually exclusive waitlists. For every
k ∈ {1..K}, Nk denotes the number of applicants in waitlist k. Nk is non stochastic.
b) In each waitlist, Sk seats are available, and are allocated as follows: applicants are ranked,
and treatment offers are made following that order until Sk applicants have accepted to get
treated or all applicants have received an offer. Sk is non stochastic.
c) Applicants that do not get an offer cannot get treated.
In Section ?? in the Web appendix, we consider various extensions of this set-up. For instance,
we show that our results remain unchanged if we allow for the possibility that some applicants
manage to get treated even if they do not receive an offer. Similarly, we allow for the possibility
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that some applicants may participate in several waiting-lists, or that the treatment may not
be binary. But for now we focus on the basic set-up outlined in Assumption 1.
Then, we assume that ranks are randomly assigned to applicants. Let Rik denote the rank
assigned to applicant i in waitlist k, let Lk denote the number of applicants getting an offer in
waitlist k, and let Zik = 1{Rik ≤ Lk} denote whether applicant i gets an offer, the so-called
ever-offer instrument. Let Dik(1) denote her potential treatment if she gets an offer, and let
Dik denote her observed treatment. Under point c) of Assumption 1, Dik = ZikDik(1). For
every d ∈ {0, 1}, let Yik(d) denote her potential outcome if Dik = d,3 and let Yik = Yik(Dik)
denote her observed outcome. Let
Pk = ((D1k(1), Y1k(0), Y1k(1)) , ..., (DNkk(1), YNkk(0), YNkk(1)))
be a vector stacking the potential treatments and outcomes of the applicants in waitlist k.
For any integer j, let Πj denote the set of permutations of {1..j}. Let Rk = (R1k, ..., RNkk)
denote the ranks assigned to applicants 1 to Nk in waitlist k.
Assumption 2 (Randomly assigned ranks)
For all k ∈ {1..K} and (r1, ..., rNk) ∈ ΠNk , P (Rk = (r1, ..., rNk)|Pk) = 1Nk! .
Assumption 2 requires that the ranks assigned to applicants be independent of their potential
treatments and outcomes, and uniformly distributed on ΠNk . It implies that each applicant
has the same probability of being in the first, second, ..., or last rank.
Finally, we consider a last assumption. Let applicants with Dik(1) = 1 (resp. Dik(1) = 0) be
referred to as takers (resp. non-takers). For every k ∈ {1..K}, let Tk =
∑Nk
i=1Dik(1) denote
the number of takers in waitlist k.
Assumption 3 (Strictly more takers than seats)
For every k ∈ {1..K}, 2 ≤ Sk < Tk.
Assumption 3 requires that each waitlist have at least two seats. This can be assessed from
the data, so waitlists with less than two seats can just be dropped. Assumption 3 also requires
that each waitlist have strictly more takers than seats. This cannot be assessed from the data.
When all the seats available in a waitlist get filled, it must be that Sk ≤ Tk, but it is still
possible that Sk = Tk: all applicants not getting an offer might be non-takers. Still, we show
in Section ?? in the Web appendix that Assumption 3 is testable.
Let T =
∑K
k=1 Tk denote the total number of takers. Our parameter of interest is
∆K = E
 1
T
∑
(i,k):Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)]
 ,
the local average treatment effect of the takers.
3We implicitly assume that getting an offer does not have a direct effect on the outcome, the so-called
exclusion restriction, see Angrist et al. (1996).
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3.2 The Doubly Reweighted Ever Offer estimator
Let N =
∑K
k=1Nk and N =
N
K respectively denote the total number of applicants and the
average number of applicants per waitlist. Let I = {(i, k) ∈ N2 : i ∈ {1..Nk}, k ∈ {1..K}},
and for every (i, k) ∈ I, let wik = 1 − ZikDikSk . wik is equal to 1 − 1Sk for applicants that get
and accept an offer, and to 1 for everyone else. As Sk takers receive an offer in each waitlist,
weighting applicants getting an offer by wik decreases the share of takers among them by the
same amount as dropping one taker, as illustrated in the numerical example in Section 2.
The DREO estimator of ∆K is defined as
∆̂ =
1
K
∑K
k=1
Nk
N
(
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikYik − 1Nk−Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik
)
1
K
∑K
k=1
Nk
N
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikDik
. (1)
∆̂ can be computed through a 2SLS regression. Let L =
∑K
k=1 Lk, and let
wDRik = wik
(
Zik × L−K
N −K ×
Nk
Lk − 1 + (1− Zik)×
N − L
N −K ×
Nk
Nk − Lk
)
be a weighting scheme combining wik with propensity score reweighting. One can show that ∆̂
is equal to the coefficient of Dik in a 2SLS regression of Yik on Dik using Zik as the instrument,
and weighted by wDRik . Importantly, note that under Assumption 1, Sk =
∑Nk
i=1 ZikDik, so
observing (Zik, Dik, Yik)(i,k)∈{1..Nk}×{1..K} is sufficient to compute ∆̂.
Our main result relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 If Assumptions 1-3 hold, then for all k ∈ {1..K},
a) E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1
Nk
N
(
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikYik − 1Nk−Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik
))
= E
(
1
N
∑
(i,k)∈I [Yik(Dik(1))− Yik(0)]
)
,
b) E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1
Nk
N
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikDik
)
= E
(
1
N
∑
(i,k)∈I Dik(1)
)
.
The intuition of point a) of the theorem goes as follows. As the numerical example in Section
2 illustrates, one can show that in each waitlist, wik-reweighted applicants getting an offer
are statistically comparable to applicants not getting an offer. Therefore, the only difference
between these two groups is that one receives an offer and not the other one. Accordingly,
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikYik− 1Nk−Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik, the difference between the average outcome of the
two groups, is an unbiased estimator of E
(
1
Nk
∑Nk
i=1 [Yik(Dik(1))− Yik(0)]
)
, the intention to
treat effect of getting an offer on applicants’ outcome in waitlist k. The numerator of ∆̂ is
an average of those unbiased within-waitlist comparisons, that gives to each waitlist a weight
proportional to its number of applicants. Therefore, this numerator is an unbiased estimator
of E
(
1
N
∑
(i,k)∈I [Yik(Dik(1))− Yik(0)]
)
, the intention to treat effect among all applicants.
The intuition of point b) is similar.
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We now derive the asymptotic distribution of ∆̂. In our survey of articles that have used
randomized waitlists, the median number of waitlists used in the analysis is equal to 64.
Therefore, we consider a sequence where K, the number of waitlists, goes to infinity. An
alternative would be to consider a sequence where the number of applicants per waitlist goes
to infinity, but in our survey the median of waitlists divided by applicants per waitlist is
equal to 1.9, so the former asymptotic may be more appropriate in a majority of applications.
For all k ∈ {1..K}, let RFk = NkN
[
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikYik − 1Nk−Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik
]
and FSk =
Nk
N
1
Lk−1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikDik. Let also FS = lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
k=1E (FSk) and ∆ = lim
K→+∞
∆K , where
Assumption 4 below ensures that those limits exist. Finally, for all k let Λk = RFk−∆FSkFS .
Assumption 4 (Technical assumptions to derive the asymptotic distribution of ∆̂)
a) The vectors (Pk,Rk)1≤k≤K are mutually independent.
b) T ⊥⊥ 1T
∑
(i,k):Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)].
c) For every k, Nk ≤ N+, for some integer N+.
d) For every k, E
(
RF 4k
)
< +∞.
e) 1K
∑K
k=1E (RFk),
1
K
∑K
k=1E (FSk), ∆K ,
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
RF 2k
)
, 1K
∑K
k=1E
(
FS2k
)
, 1K
∑K
k=1 V (RFk),
1
K
∑K
k=1 V (FSk),
1
K
∑K
k=1E (RFkFSk),
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
(RFk − E (RFk))4
)
, 1K
∑K
k=1E
(
(FSk − E (FSk))4
)
,
and 1K
∑K
k=1E
(
(Λk − E (Λk))4
)
converge towards finite limits when K → +∞.
f)
∑+∞
k=1
V (RFk)
k2
< +∞ and ∑+∞k=1 V (RF 2k )k2 < +∞.
Typically, the lotteries determining applicants’ ranks are independent across waitlists, so by
design the vectors (Rk)1≤k≤K are mutually independent, and (Rk)1≤k≤K is independent of
(Pk)1≤k≤K . Then, point a) of Assumption 4 only requires that the vectors (Pk)1≤k≤K be
mutually independent. This is often plausible, for instance when the waitlists correspond to
different schools. If point a) is not plausible, then Theorem 3.1 below still holds conditional
on applicants’ potential treatments and outcomes, as in Abadie et al. (2017) or Li & Ding
(2017). Point b) requires that the number of takers be independent of their average treatment
effect. If point b) does not hold, Theorem 3.1 below still holds, except that ∆K has to be
replaced by ∆, and more technical assumptions have to be made. Point c) requires that the
number of applicants per waitlist be uniformly bounded by some constant N+. Points d), e),
and f) are technical conditions ensuring we can apply Liapunov’s central limit theorem and
Kolmogorov’s strong law to (RFk)k∈N, (FSk)k∈N, and (Λk)k∈N. One can show that d) and f)
hold if the potential outcomes Yik(0) and Yik(1) have a bounded support.
Let σ2 = lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
k=1 V (Λk), σ
2
+ = lim
K→+∞
[
1
K
∑K
k=1E(Λ
2
k)−
(
1
K
∑K
k=1E (Λk)
)2]
,
Λ̂k =
RFk−∆̂FSk
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
, and σ̂2+ =
1
K
∑K
k=1
(
Λ̂k − 1K
∑K
j=1 Λ̂j
)2
.
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Theorem 3.1 If Assumptions 1-4 hold,
√
K
(
∆̂−∆K
)
d−→ N (0, σ2) and σ̂2+ p−→ σ2+ ≥ σ2.
Theorem 3.1 implies that ∆̂ is an asymptotically normal estimator of ∆K when the number of
waitlists goes to infinity. As is usually the case for estimators constructed using independent
but not identically distributed random variables (see e.g. Liu & Singh, 1995), the asymptotic
variance σ2 of ∆̂ can only be conservatively estimated: we provide a consistent estimator of
σ2+, an upper bound of σ2. That estimator can then be used to build conservative confidence
intervals for ∆K .4 When all the Λk have the same expectation, something that for instance
happens when all waitlists have the same number of applicants, the same expectation of the
proportion of takers, and the same expectations of takers’ and non takers’ potential outcomes,
σ2+ = σ
2 so those confidence intervals are exact. Finally, in simulations shown in Section ??
of the Web appendix, we find that the asymptotic distribution in Theorem 3.1 approximates
the distribution of ∆̂ well if 20 waitlists or more are used in the analysis. This suggests that
articles using more than 20 waitlists may rely on Theorem 3.1 for inference, while articles
using less than 20 waitlists may not.
3.3 Comparison with the Ever Offer and Initial Offer estimators
3.3.1 Comparison with the Ever Offer estimator
Let β̂EFE be the coefficient of Dik in a 2SLS regression of Yik on Dik and waitlist fixed effects,
using Zik as the instrument for Dik. We refer to β̂EFE as the EO estimator. The derivation
of its limit relies on Assumption 5, another technical assumption, that is stated in the proofs.
Assumption 5 is similar to points d) to f) in Assumption 4, and it ensures that the limits in
the definition of wk and B below exist. Let
wk =
Sk
(
Nk−Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
j=1E
Sj(Nj−Sj Nj+1Tj+1 )
Nj
 ,
B =
lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
Sk
(
Nk−Tk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
[
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)− 1Nk−Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)
])
lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
Sk
(
Nk−Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
) .
Theorem 3.2 If Assumptions 1-5 hold,
β̂EFE
p−→ lim
K→+∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E
wk 1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)]
+B. (2)
4Conservative variance estimators also arise in other articles studying treatment effect estimation in ran-
domized experiments (see e.g. Neyman, 1923).
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Under Assumptions 1-5, β̂EFE converges towards the sum of two terms. The first is a weighted
average of the LATEs of takers in each waitlist. If those LATEs vary across waitlists, this
weighted average is not equal to the LATE of all takers, because it overrepresents waitlists
with a ratio of seats to takers closer to 1/2.5 The second term, B, is a bias term. As explained
in Section 2, this bias arises from the endogenous stopping of offers in each waitlist, and from
the waitlist fixed effects.
We start by performing comparative statics on |B|, assuming that waitlists are homogeneous:
there exist real numbers N0, T0, S0, and ∆Y (0) such that for all k, Nk = N0, Tk = T0, Sk = S0,
and E
([
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)− 1Nk−Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)
])
= ∆Y (0). Then,
B =
1−
(
1 + 1N0
)
t0
t0+
1
N0
1−
(
1 + 1N0
)
s0
t0+
1
N0
∆Y (0), (3)
where t0 = T0/N0 and s0 = S0/N0 respectively denote the proportion of takers and the ratio
of seats to applicants in the waitlist. One can show that the right hand side of (3) is decreasing
in N0, decreasing in t0, increasing in s0, and increasing in
∣∣∆Y (0)∣∣.
Then, we study how waitlists’ heterogeneity affects |B|. Let (Sa0 , Sb0) ∈ {2..T0 − 1}2, let
(T a0 , T
b
0 ) ∈ {3..N0}2, and let ∆Y (0),k = E
[
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)− 1Nk−Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)
]
.
The three following results hold:
1. If
(
Nk, Tk,∆Y (0),k
)
=
(
N0, T0,∆Y (0)
)
for all k, |B| is larger if α% of the waitlists have
Sa0 seats and (1− α)% have Sb0 seats than if all of them have αSa0 + (1− α)Sb0 seats.
2. If
(
Nk, Sk,∆Y (0),k
)
=
(
N0, S0,∆Y (0)
)
for all k, |B| is larger if α% of the waitlists have
T a0 takers and (1−α)% have T b0 takers than if all of them have αT a0 + (1−α)T b0 takers.
3. If
(
Tk
Nk
, SkNk ,∆Y (0),k
)
=
(
t0, s0,∆Y (0)
)
for all k, |B| is larger if α% of the waitlists have Na0
applicants and (1−α)% have N b0 applicants than if all have αNa0 +(1−α)N b0 applicants.
Overall, |B| seems to be higher when waitlists have heterogeneous numbers of applicants,
takers, and seats. The impact of waitlists’ heterogeneity on |B| can be large. For instance, if(
Nk, Sk,∆Y (0),k
)
=
(
40, 20,∆Y (0)
)
, |B| is 17.1% larger if 50% of waitlists have 25 takers and
50% have 35 takers than if all have 30 takers.
3.3.2 Comparison with the Initial Offer estimator
Let Z ′ik = 1{Rik ≤ Sk} be an indicator for applicants in the initial round of offers, the so-called
initial-offer instrument. Let S =
∑K
k=1 Sk. Let w
I
ik = Z
′
ik× SN × NkSk +(1− Z ′ik)× N−SN ×
Nk
Nk−Sk
be the propensity score weights attached to initial offers. Let β̂IPS be the coefficient of Dik in
5This can be seen from the fact that
Sk
(
Nk−Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
= Tk
Sk
Tk
(
1− Sk
(Tk+1)Nk/(Nk+1)
)
≈ Tk SkTk
(
1− Sk
Tk
)
.
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a 2SLS regression of Yik on Dik, using Z ′ik as the instrument, and weighted by w
I
ik. We call
β̂IPS the IO estimator.
Under Assumptions 1-2 and a technical condition similar to Assumption 4,
√
K
(
β̂IPS −∆K
)
converges towards a normal distribution. Contrary to Zik, Z ′ik is only a function of applicants’
random numbers and of the number of seats in their waitlist. Thus, it satisfies the random
instrument assumption in Imbens & Angrist (1994). Under Assumption 1, it also satisfies the
monotonicity condition therein. Then, one can show that β̂IPS is an asymptotically normal
estimator of the LATE of applicants complying with an initial offer. As those are a random
subset of the takers, this LATE is equal to ∆K .
However, using β̂IPS instead of ∆̂ may result in a large loss of precision. In simulations shown
in Section ?? in our Web appendix, we find that the variance of ∆̂ is between 27.6 and 57.3%
smaller than that of β̂IPS , depending on the design we consider. This may reflect the fact that
β̂IPS ’s first stage is lower than that of ∆̂, as some takers that do not get an initial offer get
one in a subsequent round and get treated.
4 Application to Blattman & Annan (2016)
After the second Liberian civil war, some ex-fighters started engaging in illegal activities, and
working abroad as mercenaries. Blattman & Annan (2016)6 study the effect of an agricultural
training on their employment and on their social networks. By improving their labor market
opportunities, the program hoped to reduce their interest in illegal and mercenary activities,
and to sever their relationships with other ex-combatants. To allocate the treatment, the
authors divided applicants into 70 waitlists, according to the training site they applied for,
their former military rank, and their community. In each waitlist, they randomly ranked
applicants, and offers were made following that ranking until the seats available were filled.
Blattman & Annan (2016) estimate the training’s effect on 62 outcomes, that are either
applicants’ answers to survey questions, or indexes averaging their answers to several related
questions. To preserve space, we only consider some outcomes. Here are the rules we used
to make our selection: we chose indexes rather than questions averaged into an index; among
questions not averaged into an index, we discarded those asking applicants to give a subjective
opinion; finally, we discarded a few measures the authors did not comment on in the paper.
We end up with four measures of employment, one measure of applicants’ interest in working
as mercenaries, and five measures of their social network.
For each outcome, Table 3 below shows the EO estimator computed by the authors, and
the DREO estimator computed with the same controls as those used by the authors.7 An
6Blattman & Annan (2016) is one of the few articles in our survey in Section ?? whose data is not proprietary.
7The DREO estimator with controls is defined in Section ?? of the Web Appendix.
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estimate of σ̂+/
√
K − 1 is shown next to each DREO estimator.8 The standard errors next
to each EO estimator are computed using a bootstrap clustered at the waitlist level.9 The
table also shows the p-value of a t-test that the EO and DREO estimators are equal, also
computed using the bootstrap. Finally, the table shows the estimated difference between the
mean of Yik(0) among non-takers and takers. The EO and DREO estimators are close for
all employment outcomes, but they significantly differ for three of the other outcomes. For
those outcomes, the differences between the estimators are large: for applicants’ interest in
mercenary work, the DREO estimator is 51.0% larger in absolute value than the EO one; for
applicants’ relations with their ex-commanders, the DREO estimator is 47.4% larger, and it
is statistically significant while the EO estimator is not; for applicants’ social network quality,
the DREO estimator is three times larger, but none of the two estimators is significant. For
the first two outcomes, the estimated difference between the mean of Yik(0) of takers and
non-takers is large, which may explain why the EO and DREO estimators differ.
Table 3: Estimators of the LATE in Blattman & Annan (2016)
EO (s.e.) DREO (s.e.) EO=DREO ∆Y (0) (s.e.)
Works in agriculture 0.155 (0.041) 0.167 (0.037) 0.294 0.020 (0.045)
Hours illegal work -3.697 (1.783) -3.188 (1.614) 0.264 -2.807 (3.126)
Hours farming work 4.090 (1.473) 4.319 (1.472) 0.654 3.070 (2.219)
Income index 0.157 (0.081) 0.169 (0.069) 0.663 -0.087 (0.140)
Interest mercenary work -0.239 (0.136) -0.361 (0.155) 0.041 0.307 (0.226)
Relations ex-combatants 0.073 (0.085) 0.050 (0.097) 0.501 -0.079 (0.149)
Relations ex-commanders -0.154 (0.114) -0.227 (0.109) 0.026 0.251 (0.141)
Social network quality 0.027 (0.074) 0.082 (0.068) 0.092 -0.041 (0.128)
Social support 0.188 (0.087) 0.161 (0.089) 0.345 -0.165 (0.135)
Relationships families 0.133 (0.079) 0.161 (0.079) 0.228 -0.059 (0.143)
N 1,025 1,016
Notes. Columns 2 and 3 show the EO and DREO estimators in Blattman & Annan (2016), for the outcome
variables in Column 1, and with the same controls as in Blattman & Annan (2016). The EO estimators are
computed using all the waitlists, while the DREO estimators are computed excluding one waitlist that had less
than two seats. An estimate of σ̂+/
√
K − 1 accounting for the controls included in the estimation is shown
next to each DREO estimator, between parentheses. Standard errors computed using a bootstrap clustered at
the waitlist level are shown next to each EO estimator. Column 4 shows the p-value of a t-test that the EO
and DREO estimators are equal, using the bootstrap to compute the standard error of the difference between
the two estimators. Column 5 shows the estimated difference between the mean of Yik(0) among takers and
non-takers, as well as the bootstrap standard error of that difference.
8To account for the controls included in the estimation, Yik and Dik are regressed on the controls, and then
the residuals from those two regressions are used instead of Yik and Dik in the computation of σ̂+.
9It follows from Theorem 2 in Liu & Singh (1995) that under point a) of Assumption 4 and the technical
conditions therein, this bootstrap yields a conservative estimate of the variance of the EO estimator.
12
5 Conclusion
When the seats available for a treatment are allocated using randomized waitlists, we show
that applicants getting and not getting an offer are not statistically comparable. Accordingly,
a commonly used estimator of the treatment effect, the ever-offer estimator, is inconsistent
when the number of waitlists goes to infinity. We propose a new estimator, the doubly-
reweighted ever-offer (DREO) estimator, and we show that it is consistent and asymptotically
normal. Simulations show that the DREO estimator is more efficient than another consistent
estimator, the initial-offer estimator. Overall, we recommend that practitioners use the DREO
estimator when they analyze randomized waitlists.
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A Proofs
The next lemma shows that the expectation of the average of any function of potential treat-
ments and outcomes is the same among wik-reweighted applicants getting an offer and those
not getting an offer. ∀(i, k) ∈ I, let Pik = (Dik(1), Yik(0), Yik(1)).
Lemma A.1 If Assumptions 1-3 hold, then ∀k ∈ {1..K} and for any function φ : R3 7→ R,
E
 1
Lk − 1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikφ (Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
 = E
 1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
φ (Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
 = 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ (Pik) .
Proof of Lemma A.1
We start by showing that
E
 1
Lk − 1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikφ (Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
 = 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ (Pik) . (4)
First, we show that (4) holds when Pk is such that Tk < Nk. Then, we have
E
 1
Lk − 1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikφ (Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk

= E
(
Nk∑
i=1
1
Lk − 1
(
1− Dik(1)
Sk
)
φ(Pik)1{Rik ≤ Lk}
∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
)
=
Nk∑
i=1
(
1− Dik(1)
Sk
)
φ(Pik)E
(
1
Lk − 11{Rik ≤ Lk}
∣∣∣∣ Pk)
=
Nk∑
i=1
(
1− Dik(1)
Sk
)
φ(Pik)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
P (Lk = l|Pk) 1
l − 1E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Pk)
=
Nk∑
i=1
(
1− Dik(1)
Sk
)
φ(Pik)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk
Tk
) 1
l − 1E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Pk)
=
Nk∑
i=1
(
1− Dik(1)
Sk
)
φ(Pik)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk
Tk
) 1
l − 1
(
Dik(1)
Sk
Tk
+ (1−Dik(1)) l − Sk
Nk − Tk
)
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
Dik(1)Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)
Sk−1
l−1(
Nk
Tk
)
Tk
Nk
+ (1−Dik(1))
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk+1
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)
l−Sk
l−1(
Nk
Tk
)
Nk−Tk
Nk

=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
Dik(1)Nk−Tk+Sk−1∑
l=Sk−1
(
l−1
Sk−2
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk−1
Tk−1
) + (1−Dik(1))Nk−1−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk−1
Tk
)

=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik). (5)
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The first equality follows from the definitions of wik, Zik, and Dik. The second equality
holds because Dik(1) and φ(Pik) are functions of Pk, Nk and Sk are non stochastic, and the
conditional expectation is linear. The third follows from the law of iterated expectations, and
the fact that Lk is included between Sk and Nk − Tk + Sk under Assumptions 1 and 3.
Then, under Assumption 1, having Lk = l is equivalent to having Sk−1 takers with Rik ≤ l−1,
one with Rik = l, and Tk − Sk with Rik ≥ l + 1.
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)
Tk!(Nk − Tk)! possible values
of Rk satisfy these constraints. Under Assumption 2, conditional on Pk each of those values
has a probability 1Nk! of being realized. Hence the fourth equality.
Then,
E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Pk) = Dik(1)E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Dik(1) = 1,Pk \Dik(1))
+ (1−Dik(1))E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Dik(1) = 0,Pk \Dik(1)) . (6)
Conditional on Lk = l, Sk takers out of Tk satisfy Rik ≤ l, and Assumption 2 ensures that
each taker has the same probability of satisfying this condition, so
E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Dik(1) = 1,Pk \Dik(1)) = Sk
Tk
. (7)
Similarly, conditional on Lk = l and Tk < Nk, l−Sk non-takers out of Nk−Tk satisfy Rik ≤ l,
and Assumption 2 ensures that each has the same probability of satisfying this condition, so
E (1{Rik ≤ l}| Lk = l,Dik(1) = 0,Pk \Dik(1)) = l − Sk
Nk − Tk . (8)
Plugging (7) and (8) into (6) yields the fifth equality. The sixth and seventh equalities follow
after some algebra.
Then, we prove the eighth equality. Before that, note that Tk < Nk and Assumption 3 ensure
that 1 ≤ Sk − 1 ≤ Tk − 1 ≤ Nk − 1 and 1 ≤ Sk ≤ Tk ≤ Nk − 1, thus ensuring that all the
quantities that follow are well-defined. There are
(
Nk−1
Tk−1
)
ways of distributing Tk − 1 units
over Nk − 1 ranks. The rank of the Sk − 1th unit must be included between Sk − 1 and
Nk − Tk + Sk − 1, and for every l ∈ {Sk − 1..Nk − Tk + Sk − 1}, there are
(
l−1
Sk−2
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−Sk
)
ways of distributing those Tk − 1 units while having that the Sk − 1th unit is at the lth rank.
Therefore,
Nk−Tk+Sk−1∑
l=Sk−1
(
l − 1
Sk − 2
)(
Nk − 1− l
Tk − Sk
)
=
(
Nk − 1
Tk − 1
)
. (9)
Similarly, when distributing Tk units over Nk − 1 ranks, the rank of the Skth unit must lie
between Sk and Nk−1−Tk+Sk. For every l ∈ {Sk..Nk−1−Tk+Sk}, there are
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−Sk
)
ways of distributing those Tk units while having the Skth unit at the lth rank. Thus,
Nk−1−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l − 1
Sk − 1
)(
Nk − 1− l
Tk − Sk
)
=
(
Nk − 1
Tk
)
. (10)
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The eighth equality follows from (9) and (10). This concludes the proof of (5).
Second, we show that (4) holds when Pk is such that Tk = Nk. Then, we have
E
 1
Lk − 1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikφ(Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
 = E( Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
1
Sk
1{Rik ≤ Sk}
∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
)
=
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
1
Sk
E (1{Rik ≤ Sk}| Pk)
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik). (11)
The first equality follows from the definition of wik and from the fact that if Tk = Nk, Lk = Sk.
The second equality holds because φ(Pik) is a function of Pk, Nk and Sk are non stochastic,
and the conditional expectation is linear. The third equality follows from the fact that under
Assumption 2, if Tk = Nk then conditional on Pk each applicant has a probability SkNk of
having Rik ≤ Sk. This proves (11). (5) and (11) prove (4).
We then show that
E
 1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
φ (Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
 = 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ (Pik) . (12)
First, we show that (12) holds when Pk is such that Tk < Nk. Then, we have
E
(
1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
φ (Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
)
=
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)E
(
1
Nk − Lk 1{Rik > Lk}
∣∣∣∣ Pk)
=
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk
Tk
) 1
Nk − lE (1{Rik > l}| Lk = l,Pk)
=
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk
Tk
) 1
Nk − l
(
Dik(1)
Tk − Sk
Tk
+ (1−Dik(1))Nk − Tk − l + Sk
Nk − Tk
)
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
(
Dik(1)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)
Tk−Sk
Nk−l(
Nk
Tk
)
Tk
Nk
+ (1−Dik(1))
Nk−1−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)
Nk−Tk−l+Sk
Nk−l(
Nk
Tk
)
Nk−Tk
Nk
)
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
(
Dik(1)
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−1−Sk
)(
Nk−1
Tk−1
) + (1−Dik(1))Nk−1−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk−1
Tk
) )
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik). (13)
This derivation follows from arguments similar to those used when deriving (5). We only
prove the last equality. Note that Assumption 3 ensures that 1 ≤ Sk ≤ Tk − 1 ≤ Nk − 1,
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thus ensuring that all the quantities that follow are well-defined. There are
(
Nk−1
Tk−1
)
ways of
distributing Tk − 1 units over Nk − 1 ranks. The rank of the Skth unit must be included
between Sk and Nk−Tk +Sk, and for every l ∈ {Sk..Nk−Tk +Sk}, there are
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−1−l
Tk−1−Sk
)
ways of distributing those Tk − 1 units while having that the Skth unit is at the lth rank.
Therefore,
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l − 1
Sk − 1
)(
Nk − 1− l
Tk − 1− Sk
)
=
(
Nk − 1
Tk − 1
)
. (14)
The last equality in the derivation of (13) follows from (10) and (14).
Second, we show that (12) holds when Pk is such that Tk = Nk. Then, we have
E
(
1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
φ(Pik)
∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
)
=
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik)
1
Nk − SkE (1{Rik > Sk}| Pk) =
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
φ(Pik). (15)
This derivation follows from arguments similar to those used when deriving (11). (13) and
(15) prove (12). QED.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
We only prove point a), point b) follows from a similar argument.
E
 1
K
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
 1
Lk − 1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikYik − 1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik

=
1
K
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
E
E
 1
Lk − 1
∑
i:Zik=1
wikYik(Dik(1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk
− E
 1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik(0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pk

=
1
K
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
E
(
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
[Yik(Dik(1))− Yik(0)]
)
= E
 1
N
∑
(i,k)∈I
[Yik(Dik(1))− Yik(0)]
 .
The first equality follows from the linearity of the expectation, from the fact Nk and N
are not stochastic, from point c) of Assumption 1 and the definitions of Yik and Dik, from
the law of iterated expectations, and from the linearity of the conditional expectation. The
second equality follows from Lemma A.1, with φ(Pik) = Yik(Dik(1)) for the first conditional
expectation, and φ(Pik) = Yik(0) for the second one. The third equality follows after some
algebra. QED.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 below makes use of the following lemma, where Op(1) (resp. op(1))
stands for a sequence of random variables bounded in probability (resp. converging towards
0 in probability), see, e.g., Van der Vaart (2000).
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Lemma A.2 Let (AK)K∈N and (BK)K∈N be two sequences of real numbers such that for
every K, BK ≥ C for some real number C > 0, and AKBK converges towards a finite limit. Let
(ÂK)K∈N and (B̂K)K∈N be two sequences of random variables such that
√
K
(
ÂK −AK
)
=
Op(1) and
√
K
(
B̂K −BK
)
= Op(1). Then,
√
K
(
ÂK
B̂K
− AK
BK
)
=
√
K
1
BK
(
(ÂK −AK)− AK
BK
(B̂K −BK)
)
+ oP (1).
Proof of Lemma A.2
√
K
(
ÂK −AK
)
= Op(1) and
√
K
(
B̂K −BK
)
= Op(1) imply that ÂK − AK = op(1) and
B̂K−BK = op(1). Therefore, with probability approaching one, max
(
ÂK −AK , B̂K −BK
)
≤
C
2 . Then, Lemma S3 in de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfœuille (2018) implies that with probability
approaching one,∣∣∣∣∣√K
(
ÂK
B̂K
− AK
BK
)
−
√
K
1
BK
(
(ÂK −AK)− AK
BK
(B̂K −BK)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
2
(
1 + AKBK
)
C2
max
(√
K(ÂK −AK),
√
K(B̂K −BK)
)
max
(
ÂK −AK , B̂K −BK
)
.
The right hand side of the inequality in the previous display is an op(1). With probability
approaching one, the left hand side is bounded by an op(1), so it is itself an op(1). QED.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof that
√
K
(
∆̂−∆K
)
d−→ N (0, σ2)
First, notice that
∆K = E
 T
E(T )
1
T
∑
(i,k):Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)]

=
E
(
1
N
∑
(i,k)∈I [Yik(Dik(1))− Yik(0)]
)
E
(
1
N
∑
(i,k)∈I Dik(1)
)
=
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1RFk
)
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
) . (16)
The first equality follows from point b) of Assumption 4. The second equality follows from
some algebra, and from point a) of Assumption 1. The last equality follows from points a)
and b) of Lemma 3.1 and from the definitions of RFk and FSk.
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Then,
√
K
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk
))
=
∑K
k=1 (RFk − E (RFk))√∑K
k=1 V (RFk)
√√√√ 1
K
K∑
k=1
V (RFk). (17)
Point a) of Assumption 1 and point a) of Assumption 4 ensure that (RFk)k∈N is a sequence of
independent random variables. Point d) of Assumption 4 ensures that for every k, the expec-
tation and variance of RFk exist, and point e) ensures that (RFk)k∈N satisfies the Liapunov
condition (see, e.g., Billingsley, 1995, page 362) for δ = 2. Then, the Liapunov central limit
theorem implies that ∑K
k=1 (RFk − E (RFk))√∑K
k=1 V (RFk)
d−→ N (0, 1). (18)
Point e) of Assumption 4 implies that
lim
K→+∞
√√√√ 1
K
K∑
k=1
V (RFk) = σRF , (19)
for some real number σRF . Therefore, combining (17), (18), (19), and the Slutsky lemma,
√
K
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
(
RFk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk
)))
d−→ N (0, σ2RF ). (20)
Similarly, one can show that
√
K
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
))
d−→ N (0, σ2FS), (21)
for some real number σFS .
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Finally,
√
K
(
∆̂−∆K
)
=
√
K
 1K ∑Kk=1RFk
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
−
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1RFk
)
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)

=
√
K
1
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
) ( 1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk
)
−
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1RFk
)
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
) ( 1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
))+ oP (1)
=
√
K
1
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
) ( 1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk
)
−∆
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
)))
+ oP (1)
=
FS
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)√K ( 1
K
K∑
k=1
(Λk − E (Λk))
)
+ oP (1)
d−→ N (0, σ2).
The first equality follows from the definitions of FSk and RFk and from (16).
The second equality follows from the fact E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1RFk
)
, E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)
, 1K
∑K
k=1RFk,
and 1K
∑K
k=1 FSk satisfy the assumptions of Lemma A.2. Indeed, point b) of Lemma 3.1, point
c) of Assumption 4, and Assumption 3 imply that E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)
≥ 3
N+
> 0. Moreover,
point e) of Assumption 4 implies that E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1RFk
)
/E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)
converges towards
a finite limit. Finally, it follows from (20), (21), and the fact that convergence in distribution
implies boundedness in probability, that
√
K
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk
))
= Op(1)
√
K
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
))
= Op(1).
(16), point e) of Assumption 4, and (21) ensure that
1
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)
∆− E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1RFk
)
E
(
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
)
√K ( 1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk − E
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
))
= oP (1),
hence the third equality. The fourth equality follows from the definition of Λk. The conver-
gence in distribution arrow follows from a reasoning similar to that used to prove (20), and
from the Slutsky lemma and the definition of FS.
Proof that σ̂2+
p−→ σ2+ ≥ σ2.
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By point a) of Assumption 1, points a), d), and f) of Assumption 4, Kolmogorov’s strong law
(see, e.g., Theorem 2.3.10 in Sen & Singer, 1993), and the fact that almost sure convergence
implies convergence in probability,
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
E (RFk)
p−→ 0
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
E (FSk)
p−→ 0.
Then, as under point e) of Assumption 4, 1K
∑K
k=1E (RFk) and
1
K
∑K
k=1E (FSk) converge
towards finite limits, the previous display implies that
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk
p−→ lim
K→+∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E (RFk)
1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
p−→ lim
K→+∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E (FSk) . (22)
Then, the first point of the theorem and point e) of Assumption 4 imply that
∆̂
p−→ ∆. (23)
Then, (22), (23), and the continuous mapping theorem imply that
1
K
K∑
k=1
Λ̂k =
1
1
K
∑K
k=1 FSk
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
RFk − ∆̂ 1
K
K∑
k=1
FSk
)
p−→ lim
K→+∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E (Λk) . (24)
Similarly, one can show that
1
K
K∑
k=1
Λ̂2k
p−→ lim
K→+∞
1
K
K∑
k=1
E
(
Λ2k
)
. (25)
Then, (24), (25), and the continuous mapping theorem imply that
σ̂2+ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Λ̂2k −
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
Λ̂k
)2
p−→ σ2+. (26)
Finally, the convexity of x 7→ x2 implies that 1K
∑K
k=1E (Λk)
2 ≥
(
1
K
∑K
k=1E (Λk)
)2
, so
σ2+ ≥ σ2. QED.
Theorem 3.2 relies on Assumption 5 below. Let
RFEk = Nk
Lk
Nk
(
1− Lk
Nk
) 1
Lk
∑
i:Zik=1
Yik − 1
Nk − Lk
∑
i:Zik=0
Yik
 ,
FSEk = Nk
Lk
Nk
(
1− Lk
Nk
)
1
Lk
∑
i:Zik=1
Dik.
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Assumption 5 (Technical assumptions to derive the probability limit of β̂EFE)
For every k E
((
RFEk
)2)
< +∞; ∑+∞k=1 V (RFEk )k2 < +∞; 1K ∑Kk=1E
(
Sk
(
Nk−Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
)
,
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
Sk
(
Nk−Tk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
[
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)− 1Nk−Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)
])
, and
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
Sk
(
Nk−Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)]
)
have finite limits whenK → +∞.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
First,
E(Lk|Pk) =
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
l
(
l−1
Sk−1
)(
Nk−l
Tk−Sk
)(
Nk
Tk
)
=Sk
Nk + 1
Tk + 1
Nk−Tk+Sk∑
l=Sk
(
l
Sk
)( Nk+1−(l+1)
Tk+1−(Sk+1)
)(
Nk+1
Tk+1
)
=Sk
Nk + 1
Tk + 1
. (27)
This derivation follows from arguments similar to those used when deriving (5).
Then, it follows from the fact that a 2SLS coefficient with one endogenous variable and one
instrument is equal to the ratio of the reduced form and first stage coefficients, from Equation
(3.3.7) in Angrist & Pischke (2008), and from the definitions of RFEk and FS
E
k , that
β̂EFE =
1
K
∑K
k=1RF
E
k
1
K
∑K
k=1 FS
E
k
. (28)
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For every k,
E
(
RFEk
)
=E
((
1− Lk
Nk
) Nk∑
i=1
Yik(Dik(1))1{Rik ≤ Lk} − Lk
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Yik(0)(1− 1{Rik ≤ Lk})
)
=E
((
1− Lk
Nk
) Nk∑
i=1
Yik(Dik(1))E(1{Rik ≤ Lk}|Lk,Pk)− Lk
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Yik(0)(1− E(1{Rik ≤ Lk}|Lk,Pk))
)
=E
((
1− Lk
Nk
) Nk∑
i=1
Yik(Dik(1))
(
Dik(1)
Sk
Tk
+ (1−Dik(1))Lk − Sk
Nk − Tk
)
−Lk
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Yik(0)
(
Dik(1)
Tk − Sk
Tk
+ (1−Dik(1))Nk − Tk − Lk + Sk
Nk − Tk
))
=E
(Nk − Lk)Sk
Nk
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(1)− Lk(Tk − Sk)
Nk
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)
+
(Nk − Lk)(Lk − Sk)− Lk(Nk − Tk − Lk + Sk)
Nk
1
Nk − Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)

=E
(Nk − Lk)Sk
Nk
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)]
+
NkSk − LkTk
Nk
 1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)− 1
Nk − Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)

=E
Sk
(
Nk − Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
[Yik(1)− Yik(0)]
+
Sk
(
Nk − Tk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
 1
Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=1
Yik(0)− 1
Nk − Tk
∑
i:Dik(1)=0
Yik(0)
 . (29)
The first equality follows from the definition of RFEk and some algebra. The second equality
follows from the law of iterated expectations and the linearity of the conditional expectation.
The third equality follows from (7) and (8). The fourth and fifth equality follow from some
algebra. The last equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the linearity of the
conditional expectation, and (27).
Similarly, one can show that for every k,
E
(
FSEk
)
= E
Sk
(
Nk − Sk Nk+1Tk+1
)
Nk
 . (30)
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Equations (29) and (30) combined with Assumption 5 imply that 1K
∑K
k=1E
(
RFEk
)
and
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
FSEk
)
converge towards finite limits when K → +∞. Then, one can use a rea-
soning similar to that used to prove (22) to show that
β̂EFE
p−→
lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
RFEk
)
lim
K→+∞
1
K
∑K
k=1E
(
FSEk
) . (31)
The result follows from plugging (29) and (30) into (31). QED.
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